China helped build Pyinmana’s main power source at Paunglaung, east of Pyinmana—a huge underground hydro-electric plant generating 280 megawatts,
Burma’s first and biggest of its kind.
“China has been well aware of the development in Pyinmana,” said Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese military analyst. “Unlike other countries, it shows no surprise about the [government’s] sudden move to Pyinmana.”
Although the junta has been trying to sell the move to Pyinmana as a logical political decision, observers see it as the result of a paranoid fear of foreign invasion and civil unrest. The generals are known to have discussed seriously their fears of invasion by an outside power, presumably the US, and the need to withdraw to a defensible stronghold away from the sea. An additional reason is thought to be the need for a contingency plan to meet any national uprising. Part of this plan is said to be the regime’s acquisition of 1,000 armed personnel carriers from the Ukraine, vehicles suitable for use only in local military engagements.
With its transformation into a new national capital, Pyinmana will undoubtedly grow over time. But, in view of the regime’s record in crippling the economic and social life of the nation, the question remains: at what cost?
Burma’s Other “Mini-Capitals”
Burma’s new administrative center is by no means the first artificial “capital” to spring up in the Burmese landscape. More than a dozen have been set up over the years by drug war lords and rebel leaders—among them Mong La (pictured here). Once an unknown village on the Burmese-Chinese border, Mong La was developed by former drug lord Sai Lin, who reached a ceasefire with Rangoon in 1989.
Sai Lin, aka Lin Mingxian, was a member of the Communist Party of Burma, which faced disintegration in 1989. He now leads the National Democratic Alliance Army. Like Sai Lin, Burma’s ethnic rebel leaders who reached ceasefire deals with Rangoon have developed their own mini-capitals or kingdoms.
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